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POINT I
TRENTON TAYLOR'S COMPLETE FAILURE OR REFUSAL TO
RECOLLECT HIS MEETING WITH POLICE AND PRIOR
STATEMENT, MADE HIS TESTIMONY "UNAVAILABLE" FOR
MEANINGFUL OR EFFECTIVE CROSS-EXAMINATION.
ADMITTING HIS PRIOR STATEMENT THUS VIOLATED
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND UTAH RULES
OF EVIDENCE.
The gravamen of Mr. Reyos' argument in Point I of his opening brief is that
Trenton Taylor's testimony was "unavailable," within the meaning of both the
Utah Rules of Evidence, specifically, Utah R. Evid. Rule 804(a): "(a) Criteria for
being unavailable. -- A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the

~

declarant: (3) testifies to not remembering the subject matter; ..." Taylor testified
to remembering nothing.
That is the problem.

The United States Supreme Court has consistently

held:
Viewed historically, then, there is good reason to conclude that the
Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-ofcourt statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and
subject to full and effective cross-examination.

Cal. v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1935 (1970), cited by the State.
@

St. Br., p. 17-18. But Mr. Reyos did not have the opportunity for "full and
effective cross-examination." Where a witness is unavailable, even "prior to trial
or preliminary hearing testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an

adequate opportunity to cross-examine." United States v Crawford, 541 U.S. 36,

1
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57, 124 Sup. Ct. 1354,1367 (2004)(emphasis added) citing, inter alia, California v.

Green, 399 U.S. at 165-168. Green is simply a case where the witness took the
stand, and the prosecution introduced a prior inconsistent statement made at
preliminary hearing under oath, although not subject to cross examination, as
substantive evidence. Green, 399 U.S., at 152. "(W)e do not find the instant
preliminary hearing significantly different from an actual trial to warrant
distinguishing the two cases for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 149.
That is consistent with Utah law, but it is not this case. The prior statement of
Trenton Taylor was not inconsistent with his testimony of having no memory of it
whatsoever. He was simply mentally and totally emotionally unavailable, had
never been cross-examined and could not be cross-examined at trial.
A major distinction between this case and Green, which the State has not
addressed, is the fact that the witness in Green acknowledged making the prior
statement: "the Confrontation Clause does not require excluding from evidence the
prior statements of a witness who concedes making the statements, and who may
be asked to defend or otherwise explain the inconsistency between his prior and his
present version of the events in question, thus opening himself to full crossexamination at trial as to both stories. Cal. v. Green, 399 U.S. at 164. That is not
the instant case. The Comt in Green simply ratified what is well understood, that
a prior inconsistent statement may be introduced as substantive evidence. See

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2011 Advisory Committee Note to Utah R. Evid. Rule 801 with respect to
4i)

subsection (d)( 1). The essential nub of the inquiry as highlighted by Green is
whether the statement in the instant matter was inconsistent (or consistent) with
Taylor's testimony. In fact, it was neither. Consequently it was hearsay and
should have been excluded for Mr. Reyos' inability to cross-examine. See State v.

Barker, 797 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ["(R)ule 801(d)(l) applies only if the
4i)

declarant "is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement." Crossexamination in Barker was denied by the trial court. Thus, the declarant's out-ofcourt, inconsistent statement was deemed hearsay and should not have been
admitted. The party adversely affected by it has a right to examine the declarant
concerning the statement.]. Id. at 455.
The question turns on whether the witness testimony was available for crossexamination. "Whether a witness is "unavailable," is controlled by Utah R. Evid.
804(a)." State v. Barela, 799 P .2d 1140, 1143 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A witness is
unavailable if he "testifies to not remembering the subject matter." Utah R. Evid.
804(a)(3). This is consistent with federal authorities:
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize that a witness may be
classified as "unavailable" for the purpose of the hearsay exception if
he "testifies to a lack of memory" and his "claim of lack of memory"
is not the result of any wrong-doing by the moving party. Fed. R.
Evid. 804(a). See also J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence,§ 80l(d)(l)(A)[04], at 100 n.13 (1980); Saltzburg and
Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual at 600, 613 (2d Ed. 1977).
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United States v. Hsu, 439 A.2d 469,471 (D.C. 1981). In other words, as in the
instant case, the witness remembers nothing of "the subject matter." That is
different from remembering the subject matter, but forgetting the substance, or
details, which would be subject to cross-examination. "It makes no difference
whether the witness becomes "unavailable" before or after she takes the witness
stand." People v. Learn, 396 Ill. App. 3d 891, 898-99, 336 Ill. Dec. 117, 124, 919
N.E.2d 1042, 1049 (2009) citing People v. Coleman, 205 Ill. App. 3d 567, 583,
563 N.E.2d 1010, 150 Ill. Dec. 883 (1990)[" A similar conclusion as to when a
child witness becomes "unavailable" has been reached by the Federal courts (see,
e.g., Gregory v. North Carolina (4th Cir. 1990), 900 F.2d 705 (and cases cited
therein)), and in the State courts (see, e.g., State v. Jones (1989), 112 Wash. 2d
488, 772 P.2d 496; State v. Chandler (1989), 324 N.C. 172,376 S.E.2d 728; State

v. Drusch (1987), 139 Wis. 2d 312,407 N.W.2d 328).].
The State cites a post-Crawford case which does not speak to the specific
issue in the instant case, but is illustrative of the problem. Melendez-Diaz v.

Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,311, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) citing Crawford,
supra, at 541 U.S. 54, 124 S. Ct. at 1354. St. Br. p. 18. The Massachusetts trial
court in Melendez-Diaz admitted into evidence affidavits reporting the results of
forensic analysis showing that material seized by the police and connected to the
defendant was cocaine. The issue was whether those affidavits were "testimonial,"

4
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4D

rendering the affiants "witnesses" subject to the defendant's right of confrontation

e

under the Sixth Amendment. Id., 557 U.S. at 307, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. The
Melendez Court held that,
the analysts' affidavits were testimonial statements, and the analysts
were "witnesses" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Absent a
showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that
petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner
was entitled to "'be confronted with"' the analysts at trial.

e

~

Id., 557 U.S. at 311, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 54, 124 S. Ct. at
1354.
Suppose, arguendo, the forensic analysts in Melendez were called to the
witness stand and testified to the effect that, yes the signature on the certificate
looked like his but he had no recollection of either performing the analysis,

•

preparing the report, or rendering an opinion.

In other words, the analyst's

recollection was not in any way refreshed and he could not remember any aspect of
the analysis or the report. In such a case, he would be "unavailable as a witness,"
having testified to not remembering the subject matter; ..." as enunciated in Utah
R. Evid. 804. This is precisely the instant circumstance. The witness, Trenton
41>

Taylor, should have been declared unavailable under 804(a)(3).
The State cites Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct.
2531 ( 1980) essentially for the proposition that as long as there is a body in a chair
capable of taking the oath, that satisfies all Confrontation Clause concerns. St. Br.

5
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at 18.

Crawford rejected Roberts application of an evidentiary standard, i.e.,

allowing admission of an out-of-court statement of an unavailable witness, who
testified at preliminary hearing but was not fully cross-examined, on the basis that
the statement bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability"' and fell either within a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception" or bore ''particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.

The Court in Crawford held: "Leaving the

regulation of out-of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the
Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant inquisitorial
practices." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51. Crawford made clear in rejecting various
evidentiary rules as a measure of reliability, as Roberts had done, that the
Confrontation Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. Id. at 61. "It commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment,
not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be
little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. Id. Crawford
further noted that, "(i)n sum, even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned
with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and interrogations by law
enforcement officers fall squarely within that class." Id. 541 U.S. at 53.

6
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di)

The confrontation contemplated is "a personal examination and cross•

examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his
testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,

@})

242-243 ( 1895). It cannot be called a face to face, eye to eye, confrontation when
the witness sits in total amnesia of the subject matter. One of the concerns of the

Crawford Court was allowing statements into evidence which may have satisfied
the local, changeable rules of evidence. "The unpardonable vice of the Roberts
test, however, is not its unpredictability, but its demonstrated capacity to admit
•

core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to
exclude." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. at 63. Trenton Taylor's statement
might arguably be construed to satisfy Rule 801, but it cannot satisfy the
Confrontation Clause, because his testimony was unavailable.
Here, the trial court determined that, even though Taylor remembered

•

nothing of the prior interview or events surrounding it, he was "available" to testify
and could be cross-examined under Rule 80 I (d). R.1256-1260. This cannot be
where a witness flatly remembers nothing whatsoever of the subject matter. That
was exactly one of Crawford's "rules of evidence" concerns. The vagaries of Rule

7
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801 simply make the test "unpredictable" and allows admission of "core
testimonial statements that the Gonfrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude."
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.

The State further cites State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1989)
for the proposition that if a witness is present, he cannot be unavailable regardless
of whether he can be meaningfully or effectively cross-examined. Br. St. 18. But
Eldredge's holding is mainly non-binding dicta, that "the admission of such

hearsay does not abridge a defendant's right to confrontation if the child victim is
present and available to testify and be cross-examined." Ibid at 33.

That is

because the Court in Eldredge further elaborated, "here the child actually testified
and was cross-examined quite effectively." Id. (emphasis added). Eldridge is thus

thoroughly distinguishable.
As previously pointed out, "'In determining unavailability, the focus is not
on the unavailability of the witness per se but on the unavailablity of his or her
testimony. '" Mr. Reyos' Opening Brief ("OB"), at 32, citing Mangrum and Benson

on Utah Evidence, 2015 - 2016 Ed., page 866 (emphasis added) and numerous
authorities. "A witness should be found unavailable under Rule 804(a)(3) only if
he insists he has no recollection of the alleged crime." State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d
599, 603 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1988) citing United States v. Hsu, 439 A.2d 469 (D.C.
1981 ), cited supra; People v. Liddicoat, 120 Cal. App. 3d 512, 174 Cal. Rptr. 649

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(198l)(witness present but deemed not competent to testify at trial, was therefore
(i)

unavailable, allowing admission of her preliminary hearing testimony); David v.
State, 269 Ark. 498, 601 S.W.2d 864 (1980)(a witness is unavailable under

evidence Rule 804(a) ifhe testifies to a lack of memory on the subject).
The State asserts that the pre-Crawford case, United States v. Owens, 484
U.S. 554, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988), vindicates its position. Br.St. 19. Owens allowed
ii>

"an identification statement of a witness who is unable, because of a memory loss,
to testify concerning the basis for the identification," on the basis that it was
admissible under evidence Rule 801 as opposed to 804. Owens, 484 U.S. at 564,
108 S. Ct. at 845. Rule 801 specifically defines as "not hearsay," a statement
which "identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier." See Ut.

i)

Rules. Evid. Rule 801 (d)(l )(c).

Whether Crawford, given its rejection of the

Roberts' reliance on traditional rules of evidence, would approve of this clearly

testimonial statement of a police officer, is unknown. In any event, United States
v. Owens does not address the instant circumstances.

Nor is the even earlier case, Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 106 S. Ct.
qj

292 (1985), cited by the State helpful. Br. St. p. 19-20. In Fensterer the question
was whether the admission of the opinion testimony of the prosecution's expert
witness, who was unable to recall the basis for his opinion, denied Fensterer his

9
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Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. Id., 474 U.S. 16,
106 S. Ct. 292-93 (1985). The Supreme Court held that,
The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every witness
called by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is
marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the
Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given
a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities
through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the
factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness'
testimony.
Id., 474 U.S. at 21-22, 106 S. Ct. at 295. The language of Fensterer highlights the
problem in this case, which is not that his testimony was "marred by
forgetfulness," but that he essentially did not testify, remembered nothing, in
absolute terms, and the defense was not afforded "a full and fair opportunity to
probe and expose these infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to
the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness'
testimony." Id.
It is difficult to understand the State's conclusion that Mr. Reyos may have
somehow abandoned the hearsay argument. Br.St. p. 21. Non-availability was
clearly the basis of Mr. Reyos' argument. Ut. Rule of Evidence 804 as a basis for
finding "unavailability" was referenced throughout Point I. See OB, pps. 28, 31,
32. These references are well subsequent to the reference to Crawford and the
Confrontation Clause on page 25 of the Opening Brief, and Mr. Reyos' isolated
statements are taken out of context.

True, Point I is phrased in tenns of
10
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•
confrontation. But that is merely a heading. The heading of a Point does not
•

foreclose argument of other matters not included therein. The determination of
"unavailability" is necessarily a determination which must be made by reference to
the rules of evidence. See OB p. 32, discussing the fact that it is not the witness'
unavailability but the unavailability of the testimony in relation, inter alia, to Rule
804 and the scholarly works cited which discuss the subject. Further, the State

•

truncated the statement made on page 31 of the opening brief, which was a
reference to a specific case, United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1203 (11th Cir.
2005), citing Crawford 541 U.S. at 52, 59, about which it was stated, "Since the
argument regarding the rules of evidence is rendered academic by Crawford, '"(I)f
hearsay is "testimonial," ... the Confrontation Clause prohibits its admission at

<i>

trial unless ( 1) the declarant is unavailable, and (2) the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant."' OB p. 31. The reference was clearly
to the "testimonial" nature of prior statements, and read in context with the
remainder of Point I, was obviously not intended as a complete abnegation of the
hearsay rule. Otherwise, the numerous references to Ut. Rule Evid. 804 as well as

•

801 would have been immaterial and unnecessary.

As Mr. Reyos put it,

subsequent to the quoted statement, "The rules of evidence are of course relevant
to the issue of availability." OB p. 31.
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Mr. Reyos' statement that the error was structural is also challenged by the

State, Br. St. p. 22, as having been rejected by Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986) in its discussion of the case cited by Mr. Reyos,
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 1246 (1966). OB p. 35. What
the Supreme Court in Van Arsdall stated about Brookhart is highly relevant and
illuminating in the instant matter. It said, quoting Brookhart, as follows:
(Davis) [Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308(1974)] was thus denied the
right of effective cross-examination which "would be constitutional
error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of
prejudice would cure it." Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3."' 415 U.S.,
at 318 (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968)).

•

Read properly, however, Davis does not support an automatic reversal
rule, and the above-quoted language merely reflects the view that on
the facts of that case the trial court's error had done "serious
damage" to the petitioner's defense.
Del. v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682-83, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (1986)(emphasis
added). The emphasized language underscores the focus of Mr. Reyos' Point I.
The inability to effectively cross-examine Trenton Taylor, a virtual inability to
engage in the time honored face to face confrontation in spite of his physical
presence, rendered his testimony "unavailable," and the introduction of his ex parte
police interrogation was a "constitutional error of the first magnitude and no
amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it." Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 3.
There is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for Mr. Reyos had
Taylor's statement been kept out of evidence. State v. Medina-Juarez, 2001 UT
12
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(i)

•
79,

~

18, 34 P.3d 187. In any event it was an error of sufficient consequence that

this Court's confidence in the verdict must necessarily be undermined. Id.

POINT II

€IJ

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
MR. REYOS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT BASED UPON THE
INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY THE
UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY OF NATASHA ALVORADO.
The State acknowledges that "Reyos moved for a directed verdict, he said
only that "the State has not proven the elements beyond a reasonable doubt and
that no jury could find that." Rl509. Given the testimony (or lack thereof) at trial,

€i>

this motion could not relate to anything other than the upside down testimony of
Natasha Alvarado. Take out the prior statement of Trenton Taylor as discussed in
Point I, supra, and what one must rely upon is the testimony of Alvarado. She was
the only purported percipient witness.

Thus, the motion for a directed verdict

could only have gone to the validity of the testimony of Alvarado.
Even under the plain error standard, it should have been clear to the trial
court that "(i) [a]n error exists in the ramshackle nature of Alvarado's testimony;

•

(ii) the error in basing a verdict on such dubious testimony was obvious; and (iii)
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the appellant, or confidence in the verdict is undermined."

State v. Christensen, 2014 UT App 166,

~

11, 331 P.3d 1128, 1132 citing State v.

Dunn, 850 P .2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993 ).

The evidence supporting the
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conviction of the crime charged was insufficient and the insufficiency was so
obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the
jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,Il 7.
In order to establish that Alvorado' s testimony was anything but "inherently
improbable," the State relies upon the ex parte statement of Trenton Taylor, which,
as argued in Point I, supra, should never have been admitted. St. Br. 25-26. The
error regarding Taylor's testimony only compounds the problem of Alvorado' s
testimony. It should have been obvious to the trial court that Alvarado's testimony
could not, alone, withstand scrutiny.
The State further argues that the surveillance video evidence supports
Alvarado's testimony. Br. St. p. 26. But Detective Hudson's testimony regarding
what he observed on the video is very confusing, occasionally vague, and difficult
to understand in general. R. l 024-1071. In fact, based upon the video, the police
believed that a body was being carried out of the motel, that the case involved a
body dump. R.1496-7; R.1524; R.1521. All the record establishes about the case
is that it could as easily been a murder by Natasha or any combination of her
and/or one of the other miscreants who were habituees of room 110 at Zion's
Motel, and a body dump, as testified by Shelby Reed and further testified and
sworn to by Detective Lougy. R.1522-24.

14
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<Ii

The evidence was so inconsistent and inconclusive that the trial court should
•

well have realized it would not pass muster and that no reasonable jury should
have been allowed to speculate on the guilt of Mr. Reyos. The State is correct that
where the prosecution possesses evidence conducive to the end of establishing
guilt, that it be given due opportunity to do so.

Br. St. p. 27 citing State v.

Lamorte, 610 P .2d 342, 345-34 7 (Utah Sup.Ct. 1980). Mr. Reyos agrees with the
State that, "Because trial error is essentially a failure of process, the remedy is
further process ... " Br. St. p. 28. That is what brings the case to this Court - for a
determination that the trial court erred.
But this Court, in reviewing the matter as a whole, must recognize the
invalidity of basing corroboration upon the ex parte statement of Trenton Taylor.

e>

This is contrary to the view of the State that,
In other words, even if this Court were free to discount Alvarado's
testimony as incredible, it is not free to discount Taylor's prior
statements in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. And because
Taylor's prior statements provide sufficient evidence to convict Reyos
of aggravated murder, Reyos' Robbins claim fails.
Br. St. p. 28. But this Court should take into consideration the inadmissibility of

e

Trenton Taylor's testimony in evaluating the verity and trustworthiness of
Alvorado's testimony via State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 210 P.3d 288. The State
relies on Alvarado's own self-serving statement that her "drug use may have
affected her memory of when things happened, but not her memory of what Reyos
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

did and why." Br. St. p. 31. But that hardly rehabilitates the numerous versions of
what may have happened which she gave to the police and others as set forth in
considerable detail in Mr. Reyos' Opening Brief, Point II. The question remains which version?
On this record, even if reviewed for plain error, which Mr. Reyos does not
concede is required, there was an insufficiency of the evidence that was "so
obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the

Cl

jury." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,I 17, 10 P.3d 346.
POINT III
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE SENTENCING SCHEME PRESENTED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 76- 3 - 207.7 AND 76-5-202 AS WELL AS WHETHER A JURY
SHOULD HA VE SENTENCED MR. REYOS, OR WHETHER, AT A
MINIMUM, THE JURY SHOULD HA VE MADE THE FINDINGS
UNDERLYING HIS SENTENCE.

<if

A. AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE MAY BE CORRECTED AT ANY
TIME.
This unpreserved issue is entirely a legal one, for which this Court would
give deference to a trial court's ruling.

For the reasons stated in Point III of Mr.

Reyos' Opening Brief, which will not be reiterated, it is a rare procedural anomaly.
In brief, it is a rare occurrence, and highly anomalous, where two statutes address
sentencing of individuals convicted of the same offense, i.e., aggravated murder.
One provides for sentencing by a jury, the other for sentencing to occur by the trial
16
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@

•
judge, yet both are convicted of the same offense, aggravated murder. What is
anomalous is that both are, at the time of sentencing, similarly situated. Yet one is
sentenced by the court, the other by a jury.

The circumstances are no less

exceptional than those set forth in the cases cited by the State. Br. St. 34.
In any event, it is well recognized that, an illegal sentence may be corrected
at any time. Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 22(e); State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, , 16,
I)

_P3d_, (2016).

So regardless of whether the argument was made or

preserved, whether it is in fact a "rare procedural anomaly," or whether it should
be reviewed for "manifest prejudice," this Court can address the question of the
constitutionality of the questions which are thoroughly briefed by both Mr. Reyos
and the State. The Supreme Court in Houston stated:

GI>

•

As we describe in greater detail below, we hold that each of Mr.
Houston's constitutional challenges falls within the narrow scope of
rule 22(e)'s exception to the preservation of claims. We therefore
decline the State's request to overrule our precedent in State v.
Candedo. Under rule 22( e), we treat Mr. Houston's claims as if they
had been preserved, reviewing conclusions of law for correctness and
granting no deference to the district court. Because rule 22( e) provides
a higher standard than "manifest prejudice" review, we decline to
address Mr. Houston's alternative argument.

State v. Houston, 2015 UT at ,I 16.
B. THE STATUTORY SCHEME SUBJECTS MR. REYOS TO A
DISPARATE SENTENCING STATUTE FROM OTHERS
SIMILARLY SITUATED .

•
17
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The State argues that the constitutional challenge to the sentencing scheme
raised in Point III of Mr. Reyos' Opening Brief is foreclosed by controlling
precedent. Br. St. p. 31. It correctly identifies the two sentencing statutes in
question: Utah Code Ann. 76- 3 - 207 and 76 - 3 -207.7. Br. St. p. 31-32.
Although the State speaks in terms of a subsequent more lenient sentence, to
which one convicted of a crime would be entitled under the rule of lenity, it seems
to recognize that if there are two, side-by-side, statutes which punish the same
crime, a person convicted would be entitled to the more lenient one. Br. St. p. 39.
The point is not necessarily that one sentenced under one statute would necessarily
be advantaged by not being sentenced under the other. The point is that one
statute, under the circumstances of the individual case, may lend itself to
sentencing by a jury, where in another case, sentencing before the court might be
advantageous.

One may be more lenient than the other, depending on the

circumstances. This begs the question of why there are two separate statutes which
provide for sentencing for the same identical offense. This is why the sentencing
scheme is arbitrary and capricious.
There is no question that State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, 322 P.3d 624
addressed the constitutionality of 76-3-207.7 and ruled that in the context of Utah's
entire sentencing scheme, sufficient guidance was provided under the totality of
circumstances. Perea at~ 110. The Court in Perea declined to visit Perea's due
18
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process claim, as inadequately briefed. Id. ,I122. The State seems to believe that
•

Reyos is challenging the holding of Perea. Addressing as it does only §76-3207. 7, Mr. Reyos is not attempting to persuade this Court to depart from the
holding of Perea. Nor, except as discussed infra, does Reyos have any reason to
challenge the holding of State v. Houston, supra, as it addresses sentencing
provided by§ 76-3-207, as it is taken in isolation.

C. THE
STATUTORY
SCHEME
FOR
SENTENCING
AGGRAVATED MURDER VIOLATES THE UNIFORM
OPERATION OF LAWS CLAUSE BECAUSE NOT ALL PEOPLE
CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED MURDER ARE SIMILARLY
SITUATED.
In discussing the claims made by Mr. Reyos, the State consistently responds
to the arguments made in the Opening Brief Point III, by taking one statute or the
other, primarily §76-3-207.7, as though the claim were against that statute alone.
Br. St. pps. 41-44. That misses the point entirely. The problem is not that one or
the other statute is deficient. The problem is precisely that there are two statutes
which address exactly the same offense for sentencing purposes. Any distinction is
mere semantics.

Mr. Reyos does not gainsay that each of the statutes, as

construed, is underlain with standards which guide the sentencer's hand. That is
not the issue.
The State argues that the "noncapital sentencing statute does not violate the
uniform operation of laws clause because not all people convicted of aggravated
19
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murder are similarly situated." Br. St. p.41. That is not the point. The fact of the
matter is, not all people convicted of any crime are similarly situated.

The

•

similarity lies in the fact that, everyone convicted of a burglary will be sentenced
under the statute addressing burglaries, everyone convicted of rape will be
sentenced under the penalty statute addressing rape, et cetera. It is axiomatic that
no two burglaries are alike, no two rapists are alike, no two offenders of any
particular crime are alike, i.e., their backgrounds and the circumstances of each
crime will be such that no two individuals will be truly "similarly situated." That
is the same with those convicted of aggravated murder, whether the case begins
with the prosecutor giving notice of intent to seek the death penalty, or not. If in

•

the end, each being convicted of aggravated murder (or "non-capital" murder or
"capital murder" sans the death penalty), neither will be subjected to the death

ce

penalty. There simply is no rational basis for one to be sentenced by the court and
the other to be sentenced by a jury. That is the sum and substance of Mr. Reyos'
argument: that the sentencing scheme for aggravated murder (call it capital or
noncapital), where the death penalty is off the table, violates the uniform operation
of laws clause under the Utah State Constitution and equal protection of the laws
under the United States Constitution because it divides similarly situated persons
into two subclasses for sentencing purposes with no rational basis. The statutory
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•

dichotomy is arbitrary and capricious, violates due process, equal protection, and
i>

the uniform application of the law.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees all citizens equal protection of the
law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution

requires "that the operation of the law be uniform."

The Utah Constitution

provides that, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah

ce

Const. Art. 1, Sec. 24. As laid out in the State's brief, there are three questions
which must be answered in order to determine a violation of the uniform operation
clause: 1. What, if any, classification is created under the statutory scheme; 2.
Whether the classification imposes on similarly situated persons disparate
treatment; and 3.

e

Whether the Legislature had any reasonable objective that

warrants the disparity. Br. St. p. 42, quoting Houston at, 43. The State maintains
that Reyos fails the second step of the analysis. Br. St. p. 42. That would be true if
only one statute were involved. But there are two statutes, one sentencing for
aggravated murder if the jury has found that the death penalty should not apply, the
other sentencing for aggravated murder if the prosecutor decides that the death
penalty should not apply. There is no rational basis for the distinction and the
disparate treatment, taking 207 and 207. 7 together, cannot be justified on the basis
of anything but semantics. "If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been
filed, aggravated murder is a capital felony."
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•
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(3)(a). Calling one convicted by a jury, but the jury
having found against the death penalty, a capital murder, and the other, the
prosecutor having removed the death penalty from the equation, and aggravated
murder or noncapital murder, is simply sophistry.
Because the arguments made by the State do not address this issue, but
undertake a response to arguments not made by Mr. Reyos, no further response to
those arguments will be put forth.

i>

D. ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES ENTITLES MR. REYOS TO
JURY SENTENCING BECAUSE ANY FACT THAT INCREASES
THE MANDATORY MINIMUM, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, IS AN
"ELEMENT" THAT MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.

<il

The last point made by the State is that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000) does not require a jury to make findings when increasing a minimum

penalty. Br. St. p. 44. This may be true, arguendo, when a defendant pleads
guilty, "because (when) Houston pled guilty, he 'admitted all the facts relevant' to
make him subject to a potential life-without-parole sentence. Id. 'There were no
factual findings to be made by a jury, only a determination that [life without
parole] would or would not be appropriate."' Br. St. p. 45 quoting Houston,

,r 32.

It is certainly not true in a circumstance where there has been a trial by jury and no
specific findings have been made by the jury to provide the judge a basis to
sentence beyond the minimum mandatory of 25 years, as provided for aggravated
murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7 provides for two choices, life in prison
22
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Ci

without parole, or 25 years to life. Under section 76-3-207.7, 25 years to life is the
i>

presumptive default sentence, not Life Without Parole.
45,

11

81- 83 n.149, 349 P.3d 712.

State v. Reece, 2015 UT

Thus, a jury finding which increases the

minimum mandatory sentence of 25 years to life is required. Alleyne v. United

States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) states that Apprendi applies to minimum mandatory
sentences as well:
... any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an "element"
that must be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S. Ct. 2406)(2002)] is overruled.

Alleyne at 2155 (2013). It cannot be made much more clear than that.
Thus, 76-3-207.7 is unconstitutional under the Apprendi/Alleyne standard
because it fails the requirement that "(f)acts that increase the mandatory minimum
sentence are ... elements and must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt," Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2158 (2013). An increase from 25 to life
to LWOP must be based upon a jury's determination of the facts supporting the
increase. The State counters that "Alleyne itself explains that so long as a jury
finds all the facts necessary to expose a defendant to a given range of punishments,
G'i

the judge has "broad discretion ... to select a sentence within the range authorized
by law." Br. St. p. 46, quoting Alleyne, 133 s.:Ct. at 2163; accord Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 481. But in this case, there is no "range" "within" 76-3-207.7. Judges have
no discretion to increase the floor, a mandatory minimum, of 25 years (or 26 in this
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case, based upon a jury finding) to, say, thirty-five or forty years. There are only
two options: 25 to life or life without parole. Alleyne stands for the proposition
that any fact which supports the increase from the mandatory minimum of 25 years
to a mandatory life sentence is an "element" that must be submitted to the jury.
CONLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Reyos requests this Court to reverse the
decision of the trial court and remand the matter for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this

')-1

day of August, 2016.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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